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"Failure to offset the continued shrinkage
of the value of the nation's monetary unit through
compensating investment measures in the management of
the Permanent Funds will impose an ever-increasing
burden on the taxpayers of the State, for the mounting
loss of real income received by the beneficiary in
stitutions from their invested endowments will require
an offsetting increase in legislative appropriations
for institutional maintenance.
The hazards of an
aggressive program of investment in growth equities
are no greater, it should be recognized, than the
predictable loss that will be incurred through failure
to adopt adequate counterinflationary measures in its
long-range investment planning."
Edmund H. Kase, Jr., "The New
Mexico State Investment CouncilFive Years in Retrospect," New
Mexico Business (August 196^), p. 7.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem
Few if any state and local government trust funds
are able to obtain the maximum yield on their investments
because of out-of-date regulations, a lack of professional
management, poor choices of investment media, or a combina
tion of these problems.^

In the investment environment, "a

dollar not made is as bad as a dollar lost.

Therefore,

negative inaction on the part of a manager is as costly as
reckless action.

In fact in the history of the American

pension fund, inaction (disguised under the ambiguous term
conservatism) has been far more costly than reckless invest2
ment."
Even if the cause of management's inaction is outof-date regulation, only the blame is shifted.

The costliness

remains.
The trend toward updating regulations and hiring
professionals to manage state investments has indeed been
slow, although the number of states authorizing the purchase

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly. W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair
man.
(Helena, Montana* McKee Printing, 196^.) pp. 9 - 1 1 »
2
Sidney Homer, "Bond Investment Policy for Pension
Funds," C.F.A. Readings in Financial Analvsis. (Homewood,
1 1 1 .* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I970.)
p. 6 2 8 .

2
of common stock has increased from 28 in i960 to 42 in
1970.^

As shown in Chapter IV, most states still place

some sort of restriction on the amount of the fund which
can he so invested.

Montana has not as yet joined the trend

toward liberalization of investment regulation.

Similarly,

the desirability of professional management of state invest
ments has been indicated in numerous state studies dating
back at least to i960, but it was not until I97I that a
h
professional was employed.
Still another apparent problem
concerning the state's investment management has been the
poor choice of investment media available and authorized.
For example, why should a municipal security yielding 3.5
percent have been purchased if a government bond yielding
4 . 0 percent was available at that time.^

The topic of this

paper will be to analyze these problems as they have affected
the three largest state trust funds in Montana and to recom
mend methods for improving the yields obtained.
Objectives of the Paper
The specific objectives of this paper are to analyze
the portfolio management of the Trust and Legacy Fund,

^National Association of State Retirement Adminis
trators, Survey of State Retirement Systems, (June 30» 1 9 7 0 ).
^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair
man, (Helena, Montana: McKee Printing, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 7 *
^Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports. (Butte, Montana: Allied Printing, i960 - 1 9 7 0 ).
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Teachers* Retirement Fund, and the Public Employee Retire
ment Fund in terms of return on investment.

Using the values

for assets and interest as reported in the biennial reports
of the funds, the growth of assets, the annual interest, and
a hypothetical common stock growth are presented in the var
ious performance summaries.

This data is presented in terms

of both actual and i960 dollars to compensate for the effects
of inflation.

A summary of the more recent studies made in

1964 and 1970 is also presented along with a summary of the
regulation and management changes made as a result of these
studies.

Finally, recommendations are made for correcting

remaining deficiencies.

Throughout the paper, the specific

losses in revenue due to the problems noted is emphasized.
Chapter II is a summary of the regulatory background
as well as the performance summary for each of the funds.
In the introduction to the chapter, the methods for comput
ing the hypothetical growth for a common stock invested fund
is presented including tables showing the conversions neces
sary to obtain the constant dollar index and the common stock
growth- index.

CHAPTER II
FUND SUMMARY
Introduction
An historical background along with a performance
summary of each of the three major funds is presented in
Chapter II.

The historical background includes a brief

summary of the statutory and constitutional regulations
governing each fund, a statement of the purpose of each
fund, and a look at the more pressing investment return
problems.

The performance analysis consists mainly of a

graph of the growth of the various fund's assets and the
asset growth in terms of i960 dollars, the interest earned
each year and the interest in terms of i960 dollars, and
finally, a hypothetical growth which could have been
attained had the fund been invested 100 percent in common
stock.

This hypothetical growth is also presented in terms

of i960 dollars.
In order to deflate the various performance measures
and the hypothetical growth from equity investments, an index
was established using the consumer price index as reported in
the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

Using the figures as reported

in the FRB, a new index was established with i960, the base
year, equal to 1 .0 0 .

The actual index as reported and the
4

5
converted index are shown in Table 1 .

As indicated, the

purchasing power of the I96O dollar declined by some 30 per
cent during the 10 years covered by this study.

To obtain

the final deflated or constant values for the reported asset,
interest, or common stock values, the reported figure was
divided by the converted index value for that year.
TABLE 1
ACTUAL AND CONVERTED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Year

i960

Converted

1.00

1961

88.7
89.6

1962

90.6

1.02

1963

91.7

1.03

1964

92.9
94.5

1 .0 4

97.2

1.09

1967
1968

100.0

1.13

1 0 4 .2

1969

109.8

1.17
1 .2 4

1970

116.3

1.31

1963
1966

Source:

Actual*

1.01

1.06

Federal Reserve Bulletin, No. 1 2 , Vol. 5 7 >
(October 1 9 7 1 )» p. A-68.

*base year = 1967
To obtain a hypothetical yield for a fund invested
100 percent in common stock, the asset value for each fund
in i960 was used as a starting figure.

Next an index based

on the Standard and Poors 5OO stock average was established.

6
The actual and converted indices are shown in Table 2 ,

As

is indicated by the figures, after rising to a peak value of
1.77 (i960 = 1 .0 0 ), the final 1970 stock price would be 1*50
times the I96O base or approximately a 50 percent gain over
10 years.

In addition the stocks paid average dividends for

the period that ranged from a high of 3.83 percent to a low
of 3.00 percent.

In calculating the total growth of asset

value, however, a constant figure of 3.00 percent was used.
This tends to give a more conservative return than had the
actual amounts been used.
TABLE 2
ACTUAL AND CONVERTED STOCK PRICE INDEX
Year

Actual*

Converted

i960

55.85

1.00

1961

66.27
62.38

1.19
1.12

1963
1964

69.87

1.25

8 1 .3 7

1 .4 6

1965
1966

88.17

1.59

85.26

1.53

1967
1968

91.93
98.70

1.65

1969

9 7 .8 4

1970

83.22

1.75
1.50

1962

Source:

1.77

Federal Reserve Bulletin, No. 1 2 , Vol. 57 9
(October, I971), p. A-65.

*base year = 1950
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An example of the calculations used to compute the
hypothetical asset value for each year is as follows*
Asset value 196I = asset value in i960 multiplied
by the dividend rate multiplied by the stock price
index.
Thus for 1961, the projected growth in asset value for the
Trust and Legacy Fund was calculated as follows*
$44,278,000 X 1.03 X 1.19 = $54,271,545 (asset value
in 1961)
To deflate this value, the results were divided by the con
sumer price index of I96I which was 1 .0 1 .

This gave the

purchasing power of the I96I projected value in terms of
i960 constant dollars.
These formulas were applied to each of the funds to
determine constant values and the hypothetical growth of
each fund if it had been invested in common stock.

The funds

needed to have performed only as well as the averages to have
obtained the growth hypothesised.
Montana Trust and Legacy Fund
"In 1924, 18 sections were added to the Montana
Constitution as Article XXI.

Apparently, the main purpose

of this article, which created the Montana Trust and Legacy
Fund, was to establish a unified system for investing perma
nent funds, and to provide machinery for the acceptance of
gifts and donations to the s t a t e . T h e

state Board of Land

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chairman, (Helena, Montana % McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 4 ,
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Commissioners was empowered to manage the Trust and Legacy
Fund in accordance with Constitutional and state statute reg
ulations.

Specifically, this regulation was found in sections

79-1201 and 1202, and 8 1 -1 0 0 1 through 81-1008.
The Trust and Legacy Fund consists of the permanent
school fund and all other public funds of the state subject
to long-term investment not legally in the custody of any
lawfully constituted board or the investment of which has not
2
been designated by statute.
Interest earned on the fund’s
investments are credited pro rata to the various accounts
which make up the fund.
The broad purpose of the fund is to provide revenues
through the investment of permanent funds for the use of the
state's public schools.

These revenues supplement the funds

generated through taxation to support the public school sys
tem.

The per-student allocation of revenue from the Trust

and Legacy Fund for the years i960 through 1970 is shown in
Table 3.

Although the average annual cost of educating each

student in the state was reported to be $8 2 2 .0 0 in 1970* some
communities only spent around $ 2 7 0 .0 0 .^

Thus, although the

degree of benefit varies greatly from community to community,
all areas do benefit significantly from the investment income
of this fund.

Obviously, if this income could be increased,

both students and taxpayers would benefit.
2

Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports. (Butte, Montana: Allied Printing, I968), p. 2
^"Financing America’s Scb
Schools," U.S. News & World
Report. November I5* 1 9 7 1 * P* 6 0 .
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TABLE 3
PER-STUDENT ALLOCATION FROM TRUST
AND LEGACY FUND INCOME
Year

Allocation

1 9 6 0 .............................................$ 1 9 .8 9

196 1 .................
1 9 6 2 .......................................

19.55
2 0 .6 3

1 9 6 3 .......................................

2 1 .3 5

1 9 6 4 .................

2 2 .8 2

196 5 .................

23.87

1 9 6 6 .......................................

2 2 .8 8

1967 ................

25.87

1 9 6 8 .......................................

3 4 .6 7

1969 ...............
1970 ...............

40.17
34.10

Source*

Department of State Lands and Investments,
BiennialReports, (Butte,
Montana* Allied
Printing, 1 9 7 0 ), p. 4 .

Since the return on investment for the Trust and
Legacy Fund is the lowest of the three funds being studied,
there is little doubt that

the yield could be improved.

main problem appears to be

the restrictive regulation of

investing for the Trust and Legacy Fund.

The

This regulation,

section 81-1001 of the state statues, permits the fund to
invest only in general obligations bonds of the state such
as school district bonds, county and municipal bonds, bonds
of the state of Montana, and United States government bonds.
All of these investment media have had lower yields than the
corporate bonds authorized for purchase by the Teachers* and

10
Public Employee Retirement Funds.

II

The need to liberalize

the investment regulations of this fund has been pointed out
numerous times in past studies, but no changes have as yet
been made,^
Failing to choose the highest yielding security
available has also apparently been a problem in the past
which has caused yields to be lower than necessary.

The

purchases of the Trust and Legacy Fund for the years I96O
through 1970 are shown in Table 4 .

To understand the reason

that these investments in municipal bonds were not in keeping
with the concept of maximizing return, note the difference in
return between government bonds and municipals as shown in
Table 5 «

These figures support the hypothesis that the pur

chase of municipal bonds invariably produced lower income
than the corresponding government bonds.
On the surface, it appeared that the problem of
overly conservative investment selection had ended in 19&5
when the purchases of municipal bonds ended.

An analysis of

the fund's biennial reports, however, indicated that this was
not the case.

For example, in the I969-7O report, it was

noted that the fund purchased almost I.3 million dollars
worth of U. S. Treasury notes with coupon rates over 7.0

^Moody's Investor Service, January 1 1 , 1 9 7 1 *
^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair
man, (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), pp. 37
and 38.

11
percent with maturities in the mid-seventies.

During this

same time period, another two million was invested in Federal
Land Bank bonds with coupon rates of slightly over 5 * 0 per
cent and maturities again in the mid-seventies.^

There was

no indication of whether these Land Bank bonds were purchased
at a discount, however, and this factor could have accounted
for part of the large gap in yields.
TABLE 4
TRUST AND LEGACY FUND PURCHASES, I96O - 1970

Year

Amount
Government
Bonds

Amount
Municipal
Bonds

i960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

$ 1 ,3 8 2 ,0 0 0
3,750,000
1 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0
2,300,000
1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2,453,000
2 ,3 3 9 ,0 0 0
2,961,000
2,303,000
2 ,9 0 8 ,0 0 0
2,970,000

$1,709,800
994,000
694,000
383,000
952,000
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
none
none
none
none
none

Source:

Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports (Butte, Mt.i Allied Printing, i960 - 1 9 7 0 ).

^Department of State Lands and Investments, Biennial
Reports (Butte, Mt.: Allied Printing, I96O - I97O).
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TABLE 5
YIELDS ON MUNICIPAL BONDS, MEDIUM TERM, AND
LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS, I96O - I965

Year

Government
Medium Term

Municipals

Government
Long Term

i960

3.60#

1961

3.60

4.75%
3.60

1962

3.25

3.50

1963
1964

3.30
3.30

3.75
4.00

4 .1 0

1965

3 .4 0

4.25

4.25

Source :

4.23#
3.75
4 .0 0
4 .1 0

Moody's Investor Service
Another reason for the overly conservative investment

policies of the fund stemmed from the fact that the portfolio
manager for the fund accomplished the investment function as
a side-line to his regular job.

He had no training in invest

ments nor were there any apparent guidelines for him to fol
low in choosing investments.

This problem like the problem

of too strict regulation of the fund's investments was pointed
out by past studies of the state's investment policies.^

Un

like the regulatory problem which has not been corrected, the
hiring of a professional investment manager under the Execu
tive Reorganization plan may eliminate the problem of manage
ment of the fund.

Reorganization is discussed in Chapter III.

^Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chairman (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), pp. 3 - 4 .
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The performance summary of the Trust and Legacy
Fund is shown in Figure 1 .

Using the values for assets and

interest as reported in the biennial reports of the fund,
the growth of assets, the annual interest, and a hypothetical
common stock growth curve are shown in terms of actual and
i960 dollars.
strated.

The effect of inflation can thus be demon

As is indicated on the graph, the Trust and Legacy

Fund lost approximately $23 million during the 10 year period
i960 through 1970 by not being allowed to invest in common
stock.

Moreover to attain the results indicated on the graph,

the management of the fund would have had to produce average
results since the hypothetical curve is based on the Standard
and Poors 500 stock index, using the procedures outlined in
the introduction to this chapter.
When inflation is considered, the asset value of the
fund grew very little over the 10 year period.

In addition,

the interest earnings on the fund remained almost constant.
These results are very discouraging in light of the tremen
dous increase in yields available during this period.

When

it is not possible to take advantage of the opportunities
available due to regulatory limitations, however, the perfor
mance of the fund is bound to suffer.

Hopefully, the need to

liberalize the investment regulation of the fund is evident.

14
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Fig, 1 — Trust and Legacy Fund Performance
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Teachers* Retirement Fund
The Teachers* Retirement System was created by
section 7 5 -2 7 0 2 of the Montana Statutes.

The Retirement

Fund was established under section 7 5 -2 7 0 8 of that statute
and was administered by the system's board of administration
created under section 75-2703.

Investment authority for the

fund was delegated to the Board of Land Commissioners as
part of the Long Term Investment Fund of the State.
"The Teachers* Retirement System exists to improve
the educational system of the state by providing financial
income to teachers who are retired by reason of service or
disability and to provide survivor benefits if the teacher
o
dies before retirement."
In order to do this, contributions
are collected from both employer and employee and invested
according to section 7 9 -1 2 0 2 of the statutes.

This statute

provided for considerably more liberal investments than for
the Trust and Legacy Fund since the Teachers* Retirement
System could have invested in VA and FHA mortgages and
corporate bonds which were forbidden to the Trust and Legacy
Fund.

Thus, it was not surprising that the Teachers* Fund

outperformed the Trust and Legacy Fund in terms of percentage
growth in asset value and return on investment.

o

The Teachers* Retirement System of the State of
Montana, Biennial Reports (Helena, Mt.: The Teachers*
Retirement System, i960 - 7 0 ), p, 2 .
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There was reason to believe that the fund could
still have done better than it did, however.

First, some

investments apparently were made more conservatively than
required by the statutes.

In addition, as was indicated by

the Standard and Poors growth index in the introduction to
this chapter, common stock sustained greater yields for the
10 year period being analyzed than did any other type of
investments.

Since the fund was not allowed to invest in

common stock, greater returns could probably have been gained.
The overly conservative investment of the fund has
been concealed somewhat because of the relatively high return
that has been earned.

One example of this overly conservative

problem has been the preference of the fund for long term
government bonds over medium term even though the yield for
medium term has been much greater for the period being con
sidered.

As in the case of the Trust and Legacy Fund, the

purchase price of the security was not listed in the fund's
annual report.

Thus, actual yields may differ from the coupon

rates quoted.
The amount of money lost by not allowing investment
in common stock is approximated in Figure 2 .

In addition

asset growth in terms of actual and constant i960 dollars
and interest income in terms of actual and constant dollars
is presented.

Although the Teachers' Fund did better than

the Trust and Legacy Fund, its performance could also have
been improved.

17

3.50

65

3.25

60

3.00

/

/

55

Common Stock Projection-^ /

y

/

Common Stock Projection—
Constant Dollars

/
^

2 . 7 5

2 .5 0

C

/

2.00
1 .7 5 b

Asset
Growth

Asset
Growth—
Constant
Dollars
Income
1.00
Income
Constant Dollars

i960

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

(Years)

Fig. 2 .— Teachers* Retirement Fund Performance

1970

18
Public Employee Retirement Fund
The Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) was
established in 19^5 and was governed by sections 68-101
through 68-1320 of the state statutes.

The retirement fund

was created under section 6 8 - 4 0 5 and was managed by a board
of administration of the system until this function was
transferred to the state Board of Investments in August of
1971.
The purpose of the fund is to provide retirement
benefits to public employees of the State of Montana as
determined by the statutes and the Board of Administration
of the fund.

As in the case of the Teachers* Retirement

Fund, contributions are collected from both employee and
employer and retirement can be taken after 10 years of
service to the state and upon reaching the age of 65.

In

addition, disability benefits are paid when the employee is
prevented from working because of injury or disease arising
out of or in the course of employment.
As stated, the organization currently responsible
for investing the fund is the State Board of Investments.
Previously, however, the state Land Board was designated
as the responsible agency.

Recognizing the lack of profes

sional investment management in the Land Board department,
the Board of Administration of PERS did all of the actual
investing and sought retroactive approval from the Land
Board most of the time.

The total investments of the fund

19
as of January 1 , 1971 were $5 9 *0 0 0 ,0 0 0 with the fund invested
approximately 50 percent in public utility bonds, 36 percent
in mortgages, and 14 percent in miscellaneous government
securities . 9
Like the other two funds, there was evidence of
overly conservative investment of the PERS funds.

Purchases

by type of security that the fund's management made for the
past 10 years are shown in Table 6.

It appears from looking

at the table that the management was more interested in
either diversification or in local investment than in max
imizing return.

The rates of return for the various sec

urities listed are given in Table 8 and Figures 10 and 1 1 .
It is apparent that the highest return for this period was
obtainable in corporate bonds, mortgages, government medium
term bonds, government long term bonds, and municipals, in
that order.

Thus no investments should have been made in

the lower categories.
The performance summary of the Trust and Legacy Fund
is shown in Figure 3.

The asset growth, the annual interest

and the hypothetical growth for a 100 percent common stock
fund in terms of actual and constant dollars are shown.
Again it is obvious that the fund would have performed better
had it been invested in common stock.

The fund did perform

much better than the Trust and Legacy Fund, however, probably

^Public Employees' Retirement System, Comparative
Financial Statements (Helena, M t.1 Public Employee Retire
ment System, I96O - I97O).
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because of the more liberal investment regulation.

Much

like the Teachers* Fund, the PERS fund was more able to
counter the effects of inflation by purchasing securities
with higher yields.
TABLE 6
PERS INVESTMENTS, I96I - I97O

Year

Government
Bonds

Municipal
Bonds

1961

50

1962

1 ,3 4 8

295
218

1963
1964

2,536
4 ,4 1 2

91
none

1965
1966

3,576

Mortgages

Corporate
Bonds

3.369

none

2,363
2,202

none
6,620

none

2,725
3,474

4,490

none

3,474

1967

3 ,5 5 3

none

3,100

1968
1969

5,332
**

none
**

2,794
1,120
**

1970

1 ,6 4 8

none

2,439

4,850

Source :

1,685
3,363
2 ,6 4 2
7,037
**

Public Employees* Retirement System, Comparative
Financial Statements (Helena. Mt.; Public Employee
Retirement System, i960 - 1970).

** Information unavailable
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Summary
The three largest funds of the state have had differ
ent problems in the area of regulatory investment authoriza
tion, but somewhat similar problems in the areas of management
and conservative choice of securities.

All of these funds

would have benefitted by more liberal investment regulations
and by professional management of their assets.

In addition,

they would have had greater returns if their managers had
merely selected the highest yielding securities available to
them at the time.

The facts that are shown in this chapter

are, that considerable revenues were lost by not allowing
more aggressive and more professional management of the
state's investments.

To compound this problem, the state

has been aware of the actions necessary for at least 10 years
and has only begun to take the needed actions to correct the
deficiencies noted by previous studies.
The summary of past studies of the investment of
state funds is presented in Chapter III.

These studies

include the 196^ Montana Legislative Report #l 4 , the 1970
Report on Reorganization and the resultant Reorganization
Act which established the State Board of Investments.

CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STATE INVESTMENT POLICIES
Introduction
Recognition of most of the existing deficiencies in
the state investment program dates hack at least to i960 when
the Legislative Council noted that "until experienced invest
ment personnel are employed by the state, little can be done
to increase the return on the state's investments."^

No

action was forthcoming, however, as a result of the 1964
study and the existing deficiencies were allowed to continue.
Again in 1 9 6 4 , the Legislative Council prepared an extensive
report on the need for updating the state's investment pro2
gram.
This report also brought about little change in the
state's program.

Finally, after another investigation was

made as part of the Executive Reorganization study conducted
in 1970,^ the State Board of Investments was established and
a professional manager was hired to monitor the investment of
all state funds.
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assemblv. W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair*
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 9.
^Ibid.
Report of the Montana Commission on Reorganization
to the Forty-Second Legislative Assemblv. Governor Forrest H,
Anderson, Chairman (Helena, Mt . * McKee Printing, I970).
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Montana Legislative Council Report No. 1 4 ,
December, 1964
Three major deficiencies in the state investment
program were noted in the 1 9 64 study.

First, the need to

allow investment in common stock in order to improve yields
and maintain the purchasing power of the assets of the state
funds was pointed out.

4

The fact that 28 states already

allowed investment in common stock to some degree with a
trend toward liberalizing investment statutes was noted in
the study.

The Council recommended that as soon as a pro

fessional investment manager could be hired, "the Constitu
tion be amended to remove the barriers against investing
the Trust and Legacy Fund and other funds in common stock
and other corporate obligations."^
The second major deficiency noted in the study was
the lack of a state investment office with a professional
investment officer to manage the state's investments.^

The

Council noted that none of the personnel currently doing the
investing had any professional experience nor did they work
at the investing function full-time.

The 1953 "Unified

Investment Plan" was obviously not working since each fund

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assemblv, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 3 7 .
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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was managing its own investments and was getting rubber stamp
approval at most from the Land Board.

Diverse investment

procedures and programs had developed and much duplication
of effort was noted.

Thus, the Council recommended that a

separate state agency be established called the State Invest
ment Council consisting of five members appointed by the
governor . 7

This Council would also include members from

both the Teachers* and Public Employee Retirement Systems.
The council felt that the establishment of an Investment
Council would eliminate the problems noted above.
Third, the study's authors were quite critical of
the fund's record keeping, particularly the Trust and Legacy
Fund.

"Diverse accounting methods are employed by three of

the agencies; the records of the Department of Lands and Ino
vestments are hopelessly inadequate."
This same deficiency
in the records o*f the Department of Lands and Investments
was also cited in the i960 study, but apparently no action
was taken to improve the system.

The Legislative Council

felt that the creation of a centralized investment office
would also eliminate this problem.
Again however, nothing was done to correct the pro
blems cited.

As in i960, a well prepared, thorough report

on major problems in the investment of the state's trust
funds was ignored.

This failure to act has cost the state
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at least 35 million dollars in lost revenue over the years
i960 - 1970, as shown in Chapter II.

Finally when the

Reorganization Plan for investments was implemented, the
state began to take action on the deficiencies noted in
i960 and again in 1964 in the area of state investments.
The Report on Executive Reorganization
Project No. Montana P- 4 4 , Executive Reorganization,
again noted the same deficiencies in the state investment
program that had been pointed out in i960 and 1 9 6 4 .

This

study made a plea mainly for the establishment of a central
ized investment office as part of the executive reorganiza
tion program and did not deal much with the need to update
the investment regulations, a legislative problem.

The need

for professional investments personnel to manage the invest
ment program and the need to centralize the decision making
and record keeping functions was pointed out in the study.^
In the study it was stated that "the decentralization
of administration and lack of qualified investment personnel
make the investment process inefficient and it is difficult
to accurately determine exactly where the state's money is
and the rate of r e t u r n . T h i s

problem was evident when

^Report of the Montana Commission on Executive
Reorganization to the Forty-Second Legislative Assemblv,
Governor Forrest H. Anderson, Chairman (Helena, Mt.* McKee
Printing, 1 9 7 0 ), p. 59
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the varied investment practices of the state's three major
trust funds were studied.

The 1953 Unified Investment Plan

failed because the Teachers' and Public Employee Retirement
Funds were unwilling to yield the management of their invest
ment functions to the Land Board.

This would most likely not

have happened if the Land Board had hired a professional to
manage the investments for which the Land Board was given
responsibility under the plan.

This diffusion of investing

responsibility that has developed undoubtedly has led to dup
lication of offices, records, accounting, and personnel.

Thus

the study recommended that "the investment of retirement funds
ought to be centralized with the investment of all state funds
11
under a qualified staff of investment specialists."
Reorganization of the Executive Department
Investments
The result of the project study on reorganization
was the passage of Senate Bill 2 7 4 , "State Reorganization of
the Executive Department."

The State Board of Investments

which was activated by executive order August 2 0 , I97I was
a result of this bill.

The Board is composed of five members

appointed by the Governor with experience and knowledge in
the field of investments.

In addition, the Board has hired

an investment manager with experience as a former brokerage
firm Vice-President.

Under the reorganization plan, the

p. 67 .
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Board has sole authority to exercise the investment functions
transferred to it and no other agency may invest state funds.
Members of both the Teachers' and Public Employee Retirement
Systems are members of the Board of Investments, however, and
may presumably advise the investment officer.

The Board is

required to continue investing under the current regulations
and may veto any proposed investments under its jurisdiction.
Summary
"The major deficiencies existing in the state's
investment program are the same as they have been for the
12
past 20 years."
This statement from the 1970 study on
reorganization was a concise explanation of the situation in
Montana prior to the establishment of the Board of Investments
this past summer.

Numerous times the need for updated regula

tion, for hiring professional management, and for centralizing
investing authority had been pointed out.

Yet the problems

have persisted and have still not been completely solved.
The state cannot expect the new investment officer to obtain
the best possible yields on the assets of the various trust
funds unless he is given more freedom in selecting the in
vestment media.

Standardized regulation for all of the state

funds should be set up.

With the establishment of a central

ized investment office, many problems should be overcome.
Others such as updating regulations must still be overcome.

p. 39.

29
Recommendations for improving the yield on state
investments are made in Chapter IV.

Foremost of these is

the need to allow investment in common stock.

Other recom

mendations are in the area of investments either now being
made or that have been made in the past, namely mortgages
and municipal bonds.

CHAPTER IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Case for Common Stock Investment
The question of equity investment should concern all
trust fund managers and legislators in light of the higher
yields obtainable on these securities.

The 1964 Legislative

Council report on investments stated that 28 states already
allowed investment in common stock and the trend was toward
more and more liberal investment laws.

Today at least 42

states allow investment in common stock.^

Governments are

rapidly realizing that the only way to maintain the purchasing
power of their assets is to provide their investment managers
with the freedom to choose the highest yielding securities
available with reasonable safety of principle.

This includes

allowing the purchase of high-grade equities.
Just how much revenue the state has lost by not allow
ing investment in common stock can only be estimated, but the
investment yields in almost every state whose laws were changed
to permit investment in common stock have increased when growth
2
as well as dividends was included.
An example of the growth
^National Association of State Retirement Administra
tors, Survey of State Retirement Systems, (June 3 0 , 1 9 7 0 ).
2
Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chairman (Helena, Mt.i McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 35
30

31
factor was evident in an analysis of the Wisconsin Retirement
Fund.

That fund was divided into two sections so that the

performance of the fund could be more easily analyzed.

The

overall interest earned for the fund was 4 percent, only
slightly below the average of Montana's funds.^

The equities

portion of the fund, however, which makes up approximately
50 percent of all assets had the following percent growth
during the period 19&3 through 1969*
TABLE 7
GROWTH RATE OF WISCONSIN RETIREMENT FUND
COMMON STOCK PORTFOLIO, I96] - 19&9
Year
1963
1964

13.1
17.0

1965
1966

14.5

1967
1968
1969
Source :

Percent

( 7.5)
21.0
13.1
( 5.6)

National Association of State Retirement Admin
istrators, Survey of State Retirement Systems.
(June 30, 1970), p. 5 7 .
When this growth was added in to the interest earned,

the overall yield for the fund was almost 7 percent or approx
imately 75 percent higher than for Montana.

The average growth

^National Association of State Retirement Adminis
trators, Survey of State Retirement Systems. (June 30, 1 9 7 0 ),
p. 56.
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of the common stock fund for the reported period which in
cluded two significant declines in the stock market was over
9 * 0 percent.

If Montana could have increased the return on

its investments 2 to 3 percent over this period, as much as
an additional six million dollars per year could have been
earned.

This amount of course depends on both the amount of

the increase and the size of the fund being invested.
In previous studies done by Montana's Legislature in
i960 and 1964 on the investment of public funds, it was also
pointed out that millions of dollars in lost income over the
years was due to the prohibition against common stock invest
ment.

It was pointed out in each study that their observa

tions of the past were actually hindsight and similarly, the
loss of revenues pointed out by this paper are also hind
sight.

What is significant, however, is the fact that each

time a s»tudy is made, this same method of analysis is able
to point to a considerable loss of revenue due to the same
cause.

The State must at some time use foresight and autho

rize the purchase of common stock so that the indicated
losses in revenue will not continue.

Both of the earlier

studies advocated the authorization to purchase common stock,
but neither recommendation was adopted.

Either through a

lack of understanding of the needs and structure of trust
funds or through a lack of understanding of the investment
function, Montana has lagged behind some 42 other states in
authorizing trusts to purchase equities.

The question is

thus not whether revenues have been lost but only how much.

33
Studies conducted by most states prior to allowing
investment in common stock as well as the works of many pro
fessional persons in the area of finance and economics have
pressed states to allow investment in common stock.

Included

in the list of distinguished contributors to the theory of
state fund management are Dr. Murray E. Polakoff, Chairman of
the Economics and Finance Department, Graduate School of Bus
iness, New York University,^ Dr. Paul L. Howell, Professor of
Finance, Columbia, University,^ Dr. D. G. Tyndall, Professor of
Business, Berkley,^ and Dr. Peter 0 . Dietz, Professor of Finance. Northwestern University.

n

As a result, even though state

and local government pension funds do not rely as heavily as
private pension funds on common stock investment, a trend to
ward allowing common stock purchases is evident.

From 1964

to 1970 the number of states allowing common stock purchases
increased from 28 to at least 4 2 , with no information avail
able for five states.

A summary of the states regulations

is presented in Figure 4 .

As shown in the summary, the amounts

authorized by many states is small which is indicative of the
4

Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan
cial Analysts Journal, (May-June, 1966), pp. 79 - 8 1 .
^Paul L. Howell, "Pension Funds and the Capital
Market," The Journal Of Finance, (May, 1 9 5 8 )» pp. 261 - 2 7 5 *
^D. G. Tyndall, "Investment Decisions for Public
Pension Funds," California Management Review. (Summer, 1965),
pp. 27 - 4 0 .
^Peter 0 . Dietz, "Pension Fund Investment Perfor
mance— What Method To Use When," Financial Analysts Journal,
(January-February, I966), pp. 83 - 86.

unfounded worry some legislatures have over common stock as
an investment media.

Almost all state fund managers report

better yields on their common stock portfolios than on their
o

fixed income group.
As shown in some studies, the average difference in
total yield (interest, dividends, and growth) between common
stock and mortgages has been around 4 percent over the past
40 years; between common stock and corporate bonds about 4 . 5

percent; between common stock and government bonds around 5 * 5
percent; and between common stock and municipal bonds over
6 percent . 9

Furthermore, it was pointed out in these studies

that there was little additional risk for high grade equities
compared to other types of investments.

In fact, when both

the business risk as well as the inflationary risk were consid
ered, there was probably considerably more money "lost" through
investment in fixed income securities than investing in common
stock of grade A or better companies.

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair
man (Helena, Mt.t McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ) p. 1 0 .
^Elvo T. Beier, How to Increase the Inyestment Return
of Pension and Welfare Funds (New York: Dornost Publishing
Co., 19 ^ 5 ) p. 1 4 .
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EQUITIES
AUTH.
Alabama . . .
Alaska . . .
Arizona • . .
Arkansas
.
•
California .
Colorado
.
.
Georgia . . .
Hawaii
•
. .
Idaho . . . .
Illinois
. .
Indiana . . •
Iowa . . . .
Kansas
.
.
.
Kentucky . .
Louisiana . .
Maine . . . .
Maryland . .
Massachusetts
Michigan . .
Minnesota . .
Mississippi .
Missouri
.
.
MONTANA . . .
Nevada . . .
New Hampshire
New Jersey .
New Mexico .
New York . .
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
. . . .
Oklahoma . .
Oregon • • .
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee . .
Texas . . . .
U tah . . . .
Vermont . . .
Virginia
. .
Washington .
West Virginia
Wisconsin . .
Wyoming . . .

#

#

#

#

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

PERCENT*
AUTH.

. •
. .
. .
.

.

.

•

.

.

. .
. •
. .
• .
.

.

.

•

.

.

. .
.
•
. .
. .
.

.

.

.

.

.

20 . .
50 . .
40 . .
25 . .
30 . .
50 . .

REMARKS

.

.
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.
.

,
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.

.

.

.

«
a
.
.
•

50

.

.

.
•
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.

•

•

.
.
. .
. .

.
•
•

.

•

.
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. .
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•
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.

.
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•
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50
35

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. .
. .
. .
. .
.

.

.

.

.

.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
a

50 . .
75 . .

.
.
.

35 . .

•
.

None
of any corp* max.
None
**Limited amounts"
None
None
None
35 ^ currently
Prudent man rule
None
Selected industries
None
None
Prudent man rule
Prudent man rule
Prudent man rule
None
Selected industries
None
None
Corp. bonds auth.
Prudent man rule
Corp. bonds auth.
None
Prudent man rule
None
None
None
None
None
None
Prudent man rule
Prudent man rule
No limit on amount
Corp. bonds auth.
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Corp. bonds auth.
None
Corp. bonds auth.

.
•
•
.
*The figure in this column is a percent of total fund assets.

NOTE *

No information available for Conn
and Penn.
Fig. 4 .— Summary of State Investment Regulations
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The unique requirements of trust funds were recog
nized in the studies noted earlier (footnotes 4 , 5 » 6 * and 7 )
as well as the many studies by other states.

First, they are

essentially long term investors so that they do not have to
concern themselves with short term market fluctuations.

In

addition trust funds have fairly predictable expenditure
requirements.

Finally, since the retirement trusts are set

up on an actuarial basis, the added benefits or reduced costs
which can be achieved by increasing returns can be calculated.
The lead in liberalization of investment policies
was begun by the private pension funds and insurance companies.
How the percent of these funds invested in common stock has
grown over the past 10 years is shown in Figure 5 *

The assets

of these funds increased from just over 30 billion in i960 to
well over 90 billion in 1 9 7 0 .

At the same time the percentage

of the funds invested in common stock increased from 32 per
cent to 53 percent.

The dollar amount of investments in common

stock amounted to approximately 50 billion.
In order to fully understand the investment environ
ment of trust funds, the different types of risk must be under
stood.

Business risk is the risk that the firm in which the

investment is made may go bankrupt.

In this respect, common

stock is more risky than bonds since the bonds have first
claim on a bankrupt corporation.

Business risk, however, is

no longer a very realistic one when considering equities rated
A or better by one of the major rating agencies.

Adequate div

ersification further reduces this risk to an almost negligible

37
95
90

%

85

Mortgages
a 9,

Other Assets

80
75

Common Stocks
70

f

65

Corporate
Bonds
U.S. Govern
ments

6o

•.8;

55

K--

I

50
45
40

%

8

35
30

>3;

,

8
T
.&

f'

y'
y
^y\

:>

X"

.,x

-<Sr-4

V
1: ^

P—7

*v.

V.

25

20

N.

s'>

%

V..'N
15

10

47

S

[3 ^

.\:i

:

s..

45
X.

5
7 .:-;

0

=6

,-5

:

4 '.

•3 .:

in I 3

i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
(Years)
Source*

Securities and Exchange Commission

Fig, 5 "— Private Non-Insured Pension Fund
Assets in Billions of Dollars

38
amount.

The most significant risk for pension funds and

other trusts is thus the purchasing power or inflationary
risk.

This risk is usually overlooked by institutional

investors, particularly the nonprofessional investors and
legislators who make the regulations for the investment of
government funds.
That the risk of inflation is in fact a very real
concern for the investor, particularly over the long term,
is shown in Figure 6.

The value of the dollar declined an

average of 5 -8 percent the past few years.

Thus, a fund

whose income was not at least 6 percent was actually declin
ing in real value.

For example, the Teachers' Retirement

Fund reported earnings of 5 *^ percent for I969.

As shown in

Figure 7 , the value of the dollar during I969 decreased by
over 6 percent.

Thus the value of the assets of the fund

actually decreased.

All fixed income securities are suscep

tible to this risk of inflation and to hedge against such
risks, the purchase of common stocks represent the best
guarantee.

In terms of long-run investing, there is little

doubt that the risk of inflation is more costly than the risk
of a highly rated company going bankrupt.
One other type of risk that should be understood
although it is not as important a consideration in the United
States as it is in some other countries, is the political risk.
This type of risk includes that of political insurrection but
should more realistically relate to potential interference of
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of the government in steering investment in a particular direc
tion.

Our past experiences, however, indicate that this inter

ference is of relatively short term.

Thus since pension and

trust funds are long term investments, they are not affected
to any great degree.

Again, it is also assumed that only

high grade securities are to be selected.
Perhaps managers of public pension and trust funds
have not been as quick to recognize the importance of the risk
of inflation as private funds have been because of the guaran
teed characteristic of the public funds.

In this respect, any

revenues which the public funds fail to earn because of their
more restrictive regulations can be made up through govern
ment subsidization.

Few private funds can rely on their cor

porate sponsors to help out if they fail to obtain the highest
possible yield on their investments.

Thus, private funds have

a much greater percent of their assets invested in common stock
than public funds.

The amount of money along with the percent

age of their assets that private funds have in common stock as
of 1970 is shown in Figure 5 *

Their investment in common stock

totaled about 50 billion dollars or 53 percent of fund assets.
The private fund's managers appear to be paying more
attention to the work done by researchers in the area of trust
fund investment than the public fund's managers.

In one such

study made by the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business, it was determined that "over the 35 year period I9261960, the rates of return (income plus appreciation) compounded
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annually on all common stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange was 9 *0 1 p e r c e n t . T h i s return was relatively
high as indicated by Figures 7 and 8.

No attempt was made

to determine a percentage growth as was done in the University
of Chicago study.

Although the rapid rate of growth of the

early I960*s has slowed, most predictions are for continued
growth in the future.
The return on common stock can be compared with the
other returns available as shown in Figures 9 » 10 and 1 1 .
It is indicated in the following graphs that the yields on
fixed income securities increased sharply since 19&7 due in
part to the high inflation the country was undergoing.

During

this period, it is possible that the yield on these fixed
income securities, particularly the corporate bonds, approached
the yield potential on common stock.

It is not likely, however

that the high rate of inflation experienced since 19&7 will
continue for long.

It is more probable that in the future the

interest rates on this type security will continue to decline
as it has during the past few quarters.
A definite comparison is given between the returns
of private pension funds with the heavier investment in common
stock and public pension funds in another study conducted by
Dr. Murray Polakoff in I966.

The results of that study, as

shown in Table 8, indicate that for 5 of the 7 years studied,
private funds had a higher return than public funds.
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TABLE 8
A COMPARISON BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC PENSION FUND RETURNS

Year

Public Pension
Fund Returns

1958

4 .6 #

1959
i960

(0.9)

Private Pension
Fund Returns
1 1 .8 #

4.9

1961

9.7
2 .0

5.7
1 1 .8

1962

4 .2

1963
1964

2 .8

(2.9)
9.4

3.9

8.5

Source :

Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan
cial Analysts Journal (May-June, 1 9 6 6 ), p. 7 9 .
In addition to these academic studies done in equity

investment for trust funds, numerous state and local govern
ments have done studies on the return on investment in common
stock.

Many of these studies were presented in the 1964

Montana Legislative report on investments and can be aptly
summarized by the following statement.

"One may assert that

perhaps without exception the liberalization of state laws
to entrust the investment administration of public trust funds
to professional direction and to broaden the range of permis
sive investment media to include, inter alia, FHA-guaranteed
mortgages, corporate bonds, and common stocks, has led to
substantial improvement in the production of income from
such funds.
11

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill" Groff, Chair
man (Helena, Mt.: McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 39,

The evidence is thus overwhelmingly in favor of
liberalizing investment authorizations to include the pur
chase of common stock.

In terms of risk, the only really

significant difference between bonds and the common stock
of high-grade corporation is in the possible short-term
fluctuation of the market price.

"However, public pension

funds by their very nature are long-term investors who, in
the past and, for the foreseeable future, have no short-run
or unpredictable needs for funds that would be imperiled by
a temporary decline in returns or falling market values."

12

"In the management of pension funds, their productivity
(dividend yield and capital appreciation) should be the
primary objective, completely overshadowing all others."

13

Montana must follow the lead of over 80 percent of the other
states in allowing equity purchases.
Further Considerations
The recommendations in this section concern the
need to restrict investment in municipal bonds unless the
yield is equal to or higher than the obtainable yield in
some other authorized security, the need to consider the
cost of researching and maintaining a portfolio of mortgages
in considering their value to a portfolio, and the need to

^^Murray E. Polakoff, "Public Pension Funds," Finan
cial Analysts Journal (May-June, I966), p. 8 0 .
^^Paul L. Howell, "Pension Funds and the Capital
Market," The Journal of Finance (May, 1 9 5 8 ), p. 2 6 2 .
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keep politics out of the public investment decision.

If not

considered, these problem areas could again cuase lower yields
than necessary.

Furthermore, there is evidence that each of

these problems is either present today, or has been present
recently in the state's investment environment.
The Case Against Municipals
The best argument against inclusion of municipal
bonds in the portfolio of public pension funds can be illus
trated by Figure 1 2 .

Although the utility bond yields do

not represent all corporate bonds, they are an indication of
the yield differentials between municipal bonds and the yields
available through other investment media.

In addition, there

has been criticism in the past over the purchase of municipals
by state funds because it was felt the trust funds were allow
ing the municipals to be floated at a lower rate than the
market would otherwise require.

14

This problem was not felt

to exist when the Montana Legislative Council made its report
on investments in 1 9 6 4 .

The report indicated that a profit

had been made by most of the funds when their holdings of
municipals were liquidated.

14

Report of the Montana Legislative Council to the
Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, W. A. "Bill” Groff, Chair
man, (Helena, Mt.; McKee Printing, December, 1 9 6 4 ), p. 29.
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2.0
2 .5

Municipal Yields

Utility Yields

8.0
8 .5

Source:

Moody's
Investor
Service

(Years)
Fig. 1 2 .— Municipal Bond Yields vs. Utility
Bond Yields, I96O-7O
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On the other hand, the main argument in favor of
investing public funds in municipals is that such investment
benefits the people of the state in general.

This attitude

may still be held by some of the people who are eligible to
sit on the State Investment Board.

For this reason, the

fallacy of this argument should be understood.

"The notion

of aiding economic activity...by concentrating investment
within the state is clearly inappropriate and could be con
sidered a breach of t r u s t . T h e

trust and pension funds

have been set up for the specific benefit of the members of
these systems, not for the benefit of all Montanans.

Further

more, as has already been pointed out, higher returns can
mean lower taxes, a situation which does benefit all people
concerned.
Fortunately, all municipal bond holdings have been
liquidated in favor of higher yielding securities.

The Trust

and Legacy Fund sold the last municipals that were held by
any state fund in 1 9 7 0 .

In order to maintain the best interest

of the individuals relying on the returns from these funds,
the only time in the future that municipals should be con
sidered is when their yield is equal to or greater than the
yield that could be obtained on any other security.

There is

little likelihood that this situation will ever occur.

Thus,

the state should realize that municipal securities are designed
for taxpaying individuals or funds.
15 Ibid.
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Mortgage Investments
Mortgage investments should be considered in the
same manner as any other investment decision, obtaining the
highest yield commensurate with reasonable safety.

In recent

years, public funds have increased their investments in mort
gages significantly as yields on these securities increased
even though there is a considerably higher cost in servicing
mortgage investments than in servicing stock or bond port
folios.

This is one of the greatest mistakes made by public

trust and pension funds, i.e., not considering the higher
cost of mortgages in determining the highest yield.

Thus,

in many cases, due to the high cost of servicing, a mortgage
portfolio does not yield as high a return as a comparable
corporate bond and certainly not as high as equities.
Mortgages did offer a higher return than most other
fixed income securities until quite recently.

Now, however,

the yield on grade A or higher corporates is comparable.
One problem that makes a specific analysis difficult is the
fact that VA and FHA loans have a fixed interest charge but
the points which must be paid when dealing in mortgages varies.
This means that the actual yield would be increased or de
creased by varying amounts depending on the time or the loca
tion where the mortgage is purchased.

In addition there is

no easy way to find out what the point spreads are in various
places.

Thus, one seldom knows whether or not he is obtaining

the highest yield obtainable in the mortgage market.
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The recommendation is, therefore, that the invest
ment in mortgages should not be pursued as actively as has
been done in the past unless the yield on them, including
the cost of servicing the portfolio, is higher than can be
obtained elsewhere.

Generally, this policy would limit the

investment in mortgages.

Since there is no easy way to rate

a mortgage investment as to quality the risks could be eval
uated only in terms of the guarantee feature which is seldom
100 percent of the mortgage.

At the present time, higher

yields can be obtained in the areas of equities and corporate
bonds.
Investments and Politics
The final consideration concerns the need to keep
politics out of pension fund investment decisions.

This

simply means that the only consideration in making an invest
ment other than reasonable safety is obtaining the highest
available return over the life of the investment at the time
the investment is made.

To be precise, any time an invest

ment decision is made because of political considerations, a
breach of trust has occurred.
In addition, the managing of the state's investments
should not be a topic for continual political debate.

This

second-guessing by nonprofessionals usually tends to inhibit
the effective operation of the investment function.

The deci

sions of the investment manager should not be continually
subjected to question.
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The investment manager should be responsible to the
people whose funds he invests and ultimately to the governor,
but as a member of the governor's staff, he should not have
to worry about the reaction of any members of the legislative
branch to his actions.
Summary
In this chapter, a case has been presented for lib
eralizing state investment regulations to allow state funds
to be invested in common stock.

If this authority had been

granted in i960 when it was recommended, the state would have
realized millions of dollars in increased returns during the
past 10 years.

"Rising wages, higher living costs,..., demand

a more dynamic and productive investment policy for the huge
pension reserves which are now being accumulated for the pro1A
tection of the aged."
Even though no one can predict that
the future growth of common stocks will be as great as in the
past, the ability to take advantage of this growth should be
given.
Several other considerations to be aware of in the
investment of public funds were also pointed out.

These in

cluded restricting investment in municipal bonds, mortgages,
and politically motivated investments.

Failing to pay atten

tion to these problems could easily lead to diminished returns.

^^Paul L. Howell, "Common Stocks and Pension Fund
Investing," Harvard Business Review (Nov. 1 9 5 8 )» p. 9 3 *

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The need for more up-to-date regulation of the
State's investment policies and more aggressive management
of the investment program has been demonstrated.

An intro

duction to the problem was presented in Chapter I.

The fact

that Montana has been slower to act than most other states is
to the discredit of the legislative assembly.

Most other

states have encountered similar problems, but have had the
foresight to change regulations and hire professional invest
ment managers.

The statutory background and past performance

of the three funds was presented in Chapter II.

The past per

formance of these funds indicates that yields could have been
significantly increased through investment in common stock
and through better selection of securities currently author
ized for investment by state regulations.
A summary of past studies of the investment of state
funds in Montana was presented in Chapter III.

The same pro

blems that were prevalent throughout the 6 0 's were recognized
at least as early as i960 and recommendations for improvements
were made.

Unfortunately no action was forthcoming until

August of I97I'

The establishment of a State Investments

Board, however, only can correct a portion of the problem,
54
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that of professional management and centralized record keeping.
The legislature must act to establish more realistic invest
ment regulations and should provide guidance to an investments
officer for selecting the highest yielding securities avail
able at the time purchases are made.

In this way, the entire

problem of lower than desirable yields may be eliminated.
The recommendations for improving the yield on the
state's investments was presented in Chapter IV.

The most

important change that needs to be made is to authorize invest
ment in common stock.

Failure to do this has cost millions

of dollars in lost revenues, and while there is no guarantee
that the market will continue to grow aS it has in the past,
most evidence supports the thesis that over the long-run,
common stock yields will exceed fixed income yields.

The

evidence supporting this recommendation comes from profes
sional investment managers, educational researchers, and other
state legislative studies.

The evidence is virtually unan

imous that investment in common stock increases the overall
yield including both dividend and appreciation.

It was also

pointed out in this chapter that failing to consider all of
the costs in servicing mortgages could lead to selecting less
than the best yielding securities.

In addition, it is dif

ficult to compute a yield for mortgages since no statement
of discounts or premiums paid for the mortgage is given.
Finally, the need to keep politics out of the investment
process was stated.

Making an investment decision based on
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anything other than economic considerations, i.e., is this
the highest yielding security available at the time, should
be considered a breach of trust.
In conclusion, therefore, a plea must be made for
a suggested change in the state constitution and statutes to
allow a broader range of investments by the state investment
officer and include common stock authorization.

In addition,

guidance should be provided for the investment officer to
select only the highest yielding securities available when
making an investment decision.

Only in this way can the

maximizing of return to the people take place.
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